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effects in lowering overall business costs. 
Third, a significant proportion of the tax 
credits are capped, which means that 
on the margin these tax credits do not 
lower the costs of expanding Washington 
employment. Fourth, a significant 
proportion of the tax credits are awarded 
to non-export-based firms, which will 
have lower effects on overall Washington 
employment.   
These explanations point to ways 
to lower the cost per job created from 
this policy. In particular, targeting 
export-based firms with high multiplier 
effects, and making sure that incentives 
affect marginal costs to firms that are 
expanding, will help reduce the cost per 
job created.  Higher multiplier effects 
will be more likely if firms have stronger 
local supplier links. Finally, if the goal is 
job creation, directly tying the magnitude 
of the incentive to job creation provides a 
greater reason for firms to respond to the 
incentive with job creation.      
Notes
1. Dr. Raymond Wolfe of the NSF 
graciously assisted us in navigating the NSF 
data, and released the 2008 and 2009 data 
slightly early.
2. Note that many firms’ marginal credit 
ratio is 0, so that no simulated job creation 
occurs at these firms.
3. The fact that wages increased less than 
employment suggests that the credit had a 
negative impact on wages per employee. This 
finding is not surprising because one would 
assume that new hires make, on average, 
less than incumbent workers. In addition, 
lower-wage firms may have higher percentage 
effects of the tax credit on costs. 
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Part-Time and Short Hours 
in Retail in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico 
How Institutions Matter
In sectors where full-time schedules 
do not dominate, total hours matter 
greatly for job quality. We explore hour 
levels and trends in retail trade, which is 
known for part-time work. We compare 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 
taking advantage of the fact that work 
hours regulations vary cross-nationally. 
By comparing retail hour levels and 
trends, we contribute insights into policy 
and regulatory impacts on job quality. 
Our analysis draws mainly on publicly 
available data from national statistical 
offices in the three countries; from 419 
field interviews with retail executives, 
managers, and workers in the United 
States and Mexico; and from secondary 
sources.
Retail Hours—Cause for  
Policy Concern 
The issue of insufficient hours is 
ubiquitous in U.S. retail. Schedules 
are driven by retailers’ extension of 
opening hours, and by wide swings in 
shopping flows throughout the day and 
week, as well as seasonally. Retail in the 
United States relies heavily on part-time 
workers, who increasingly are guaranteed 
very few weekly hours, but are expected 
to “flex up” to 40 hours on demand. 
Moreover, today even the full-time-hours 
guarantee falls below 40 hours, and often 
below 35. 
These patterns have significant 
implications for the workforce. Lower 
standard hours reduce the base level of 
weekly earnings that workers—full- and 
part-time—can rely upon. Additionally, 
retailers’ scheduling practices generate 
variability and unpredictability in 
individuals’ total hours and in the 
distribution of these hours. Part-timers 
receive few or no benefits and usually 
a lower hourly wage than full-time 
workers. For these reasons, retail 
work hours and the firm strategies and 
institutional factors that drive them 
warrant attention.
In each of the countries we examined, 
long and expanding hours of operation 
create two managerial goals: 1) control 
labor costs with lean staffing, and  2) 
closely match staffing levels to customer 
flow. However, in the United States and 
Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to 
shorten employee work hours and expand 
part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they 
lead retailers to lengthen hours. 
The three countries provide a useful 
comparison. They are neighbors and 
share many of the same retail chains—
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both 
the United States and Mexico and is one 
of the top retailers in Canada as well. Yet 
the labor market and social protection 
institutions of the three countries are 
quite distinct, with important implications 
for hours of work. 
Contrasting Hours in Canada,  
the United States, and Mexico
We find differing levels and trends in 
retail hours across the three countries in 
recent decades. Table 1 provides average 
weekly hours levels; data are broadly 
comparable multiyear averages (see 
U.S. retail relies heavily on part-
time workers, who increasingly 
are guaranteed very few weekly 
hours, but are expected to “flex 
up” to 40 hours on demand.
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Carré and Tilly [2012a] for sources and 
definitions). Compared to the economy-
wide average, U.S. and Canadian retail 
employees work shorter hours, while 
Mexican retail workers put in longer 
hours. 
The United States has the shortest 
average hours—they are shorter than in 
Canada except in the grocery subsector. 
Mexico has the longest hours economy-
wide, and even longer hours in retail. 
Mexican statistics must be seen within 
the national context: our fieldwork 
indicates that Mexican retailers press 
workers to work unpaid additional 
hours. In the United States, supervisors, 
who are not subject to the overtime 
premium, work much longer hours than 
nonsupervisory workers; in Mexico, 
the reverse is true, consistent with a 
management regime built on extending 
worker hours. 
In Canada and the United States, 
1987–2009 time trends for employee 
hours are negative for total, retail, and 
grocery employment, but the negative 
time trend is more marked in Canada 
than in the United States: a loss of 1.8 
hours over 20 years after controlling 
for cyclical effects, as compared to the 
0.2 hour U.S. loss (see Carré and Tilly 
[2012b] for details).1 We lack detailed 
time series data on Mexico and thus did 
not make a parallel estimate of trends.
How Institutional Environment 
Matters: Three Patterns 
Patterns of hours reflect sector-specific 
strategies but also significant differences 
in institutional environments—notably 
between Mexico and its two northern 
neighbors, but also to some degree 
between the United States and Canada.
Retailers have parallel practices in 
Canada and the United States; they 
control unit labor costs by paying lower 
hourly wages and in most cases extending 
fewer benefits to part-time workers 
than to full-time workers. Still, these 
practices take place against a backdrop 
of institutional characteristics with 
significantly different implications. The 
U.S. institutional environment for retail 
jobs is best characterized as regulatory 
“flexibility.” Retail hours of operation 
are not regulated at the federal and state 
levels; there are few (and diminishing) 
local statutory limits on opening hours. 
Retail entry-level wages are pegged at or 
slightly above the minimum wage, which 
is low relative to the economy-wide 
median and has declined in real terms. 
Collective bargaining, which historically 
has improved compensation, covers a 
declining share of workers (reaching 5 
percent in retail and 17 percent in grocery 
in 2011). 
Canada’s institutional environment 
represents a form of “constrained 
flexibility.” Its industry regulation is 
broadly similar to that of the United 
States, but it has different norms in 
regard to labor standards and social 
protection. As provinces have relaxed 
their restrictions on Sunday and holiday 
opening, legal regulation of opening 
hours has moved in the same direction as 
in the United States, but it has changed 
more recently in Canada. The steeper 
1987–2009 decline in hours in Canada 
reflects adoption of these practices in 
Canadian retail starting in the 1980s, 
then accelerating in the 1990s, whereas 
these same practices had been long-
standing in the United States by the late 
1980s. Furthermore, in grocery retail 
and general merchandise, severe price 
competition also hit later. When it did, in 
the early 1990s, management in Canadian 
unionized grocery chains sought to 
reopen contracts, dissolve pattern 
bargaining, and redesign jobs (Kainer 
2002). These changes, entailing greater 
use of part-time workers, spread quickly. 
Today Canadian retail has high rates of 
part-time workers (35.5 percent of wage 
employment in 2004, compared to 28 
percent in the United States, although 
Canada uses a lower threshold, 30 hours).
Still, even by 2007, the end of our 
study period, Canadian retail hours 
were on the whole higher than in the 
United States, and the implications for 
workers were mitigated. Very short-
hour part-time work (less than 20 hours) 
appears to be less prevalent in Canada. 




All private, nonsupervisory, 1987–2009 34.13
Total, all employees, 1987–2009 36.69




All employees, 1987–2009 33.04
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 51.57
Nonsupervisory, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 51.94
Grocery
Nonsupervisory, 1990–2009 31.08
All employees, 1990–2009 30.50
All employees, 1998/2003/2008 (Economic Census) 54.88
NOTE: Hours from Mexico’s Economic Census imputed by assuming 52 weeks of work a year, 
thus weekly hours may be underestimated.
SOURCE: Carré and Tilly (2012b).
Retailers in Canada and the 
United States control unit labor 
costs by paying lower hourly 
wages and extending fewer 
benefits to part-time workers.
In the United States, supervisors 
work much longer hours than 
nonsupervisory workers; in 
Mexico, the reverse is true.
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Moreover, the impacts of part-time 
work are buffered by nearly universal 
access to health insurance. Differential 
treatment does remain because several 
employer-based benefits are not readily 
available to part-time workers—namely 
employer pensions, paid time off, and 
supplemental health insurance—but 
the cost advantage to retailers of part-
time employment is reduced in Canada.  
Finally, Canadian retail has retained 
significant rates of collective bargaining 
coverage, boosting compensation. In 
2004, union coverage amounted to 15 
percent of retail employment and 42 
percent in grocery (compared to 6 and 18 
percent, respectively, in the United States 
that year). In recent years, provincial 
minimum wage levels have remained 
higher, relative to the average wage, than 
the U.S. federal minimum wage. 
In contrast, the institutional structure 
regulating Mexican retail jobs can be 
characterized as “unevenly regulated 
dualism.” While much of the retail 
industry in Mexico takes place in 
informal and family businesses, which 
typically evade regulation, the country 
has a growing number of modern retail 
outlets, including hypermarkets. Formal 
retail businesses face a regulatory regime 
quite distinct from that in the other two 
countries.
Mexican institutions motivate 
employers—especially retailers—to 
set longer hours. Four elements of the 
institutional environment of larger 
stores have a particular impact: 1) 
a long workweek, 2) the day-based 
minimum wage, 3) universal social 
insurance, and 4) weak unions and 
limited enforcement. Mexico’s full-time 
workweek is 48 hours (six days times 
eight hours), with overtime provisions 
only applying beyond this point. The 
minimum wage there is set by daily pay 
and not hourly pay. Mexican law also 
mandates universal social insurance 
(through employer contributions), though 
the level is low and workers with greater 
market power generally get plans above 
the minimum. The first three provisions 
weaken the incentive to use part-time 
employment: 1) the 48-hour workweek 
facilitates covering weekends without 
part-timers, 2) the minimum wage sets 
a daily pay floor that vitiates the cost 
advantage of short-hour workers if the 
wage level is close to the minimum, 
and 3) universal social insurance bars 
(at least as a matter of law) a strategy 
of excluding part-timers from the most 
expensive benefits. The daily wage, 
however, also sets an economic incentive 
to push workers to work unpaid hours 
beyond the statutory eight hours. Finally, 
the bulk of retail unions negotiate so-
called “protection” contracts (whereby 
corrupt union leadership colludes with 
management) that offer workers little if 
any representation or recourse against 
standards violations. 
In short, national institutional 
environments can shape employer 
incentives and thus worker hours with 
significant job quality implications. The 
Canadian and Mexican examples suggest 
possible U.S. policy options to mitigate 
the problems of short and variable 
hours—for example, instituting a daily 
as well as an hourly minimum wage 
would reduce employers’ incentives to 
create very short shifts (in a number of 
states, recently instituted “reporting pay” 
requirements that ensure a minimum 
pay when called into work should have 
similar effects); so would policies that 
reduce the cost differentials between full-
time and part-time workers. Given the 
importance of work hours as a job quality 
indicator in retail and other service 
work, these possibilities merit further 
exploration.
Notes
This research was funded through an 
Upjohn Policy grant. We thank the W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for providing funding for 
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Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the 
Fulbright Program. Special thanks to Diana 
Denham and Brandynn Holgate for excellent 
research assistance.  
1. In the grocery subsector, time trend 
begins in 1990.
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regulating Mexican retail 
jobs can be characterized as 
“unevenly regulated dualism.”
